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I should begin this article with hearty thanks to a number of people.  First, I wish to extend warm gratitude to Paul Billingham and Anthony Taylor for organizing a symposium in Oxford on my 2017 book Liberalism with Excellence and for editing this collection of papers that emerged from the symposium.  Second, I am likewise most grateful to Gerard Bradley and John Finnis for devoting an issue of the American Journal of Jurisprudence to this collection of papers.  Third, I am very grateful as well to the philosophers whose fine papers are included in this symposium issue (and also to three philosophers – Jonathan Quong, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, and Thomas Sinclair – whose papers presented at the Oxford symposium were not available for this special issue).  Fourth, I am much obliged to the several organizations that provided subventions for the Oxford symposium.  Particularly generous was the support from Christ Church, Oxford, which also served as the venue of the symposium.  Finally, I am also greatly indebted to the other participants at the Oxford symposium whose comments and questions helped to make the event so illuminating and lively.
	In my replies to the contributors in this symposium issue, I will naturally devote most attention to the articles with which I most extensively disagree.  I am of course not intending thereby to slight the remaining papers!  Far from being indicative of any disesteem, the relative brevity of my comments on those remaining articles is a sign of my concurrence with many of their chief arguments and positions.  (Even in my lengthier replies, I will obviously not attempt to respond to every interesting point raised by each paper.  A comprehensive response is not feasible within the space allotted to me, and would in any event be somniferous for most readers.)
	
I.  Replies to George Sher

One lesson that emerges from George Sher’s thoughtful and challenging paper is that the distinctness of the two main strands in the fifth chapter of Liberalism with Excellence should have received greater emphasis.  Each of those strands pertains to the value of freedom, but the value in question is quite different between the two of them.  One of the principal lines of reasoning in Chapter 5 is focused on various consequentialist elements of freedom’s value, whereas the other principal line of reasoning is focused on the deontological value of freedom.  Whereas the point of departure for the consequentialist strand in the chapter is my exposition of the work of Ian Carter on the value of freedom, the point of departure for the chapter’s deontological strand is my invocation of G.A. Cohen’s remarks on the distinction between the value of φ-ing and the value of being free to φ.  To be sure, because the point of Chapter 5 is to highlight the degree to which edificatory perfectionists discount the value of freedoms, I marshal the consequentialist queries and the deontological queries in tandem.  However, the combinability of those threads in my critique of edificatory perfectionism is perfectly consistent with their distinctness.
	In particular, one thing that differentiates the consequentialist component of my critique from the deontological component is that the effects recounted in the former are not always occurrent.  As is repeatedly conceded in my fifth chapter, there can arise circumstances wherein some edificatory-perfectionist policies which employ coercion or manipulation will not on balance impair the consequentialist value of the freedom of the people who are affected by the policies.  Hence, when Sher points out at several junctures that there can be such circumstances, he is concurring with my discussion rather than objecting to it (though he appears to think that he is doing the latter).
	In contrast with the consequentialist strand of the critique in Chapter 5, the deontological strand maintains that any edificatory-perfectionist policies which employ coercion or manipulation against human adults of sound mind are pro tanto disrespectful of the deliberative agency of those adults.  In contending as much, I am explicitly aligned with the Rawlsians – such as Quong – whose views I have contested in the earlier chapters of my book.  As a deontological objection to coercive or manipulative policies of edificatory perfectionism, this line of critique maintains that all such policies are in contravention of an absolute duty incumbent on every system of governance.  That duty is absolute not in the sense that it is always more stringent than every other duty, but instead in the sense that it always and everywhere obtains.​[1]​  There are no exceptions to its bindingness.  Hence, when Sher asks “what, exactly, are the valuable aspects of freedom that Kramer takes to support this sweeping pronouncement [about the illiberality of all coercive and manipulative measures undertaken in the service of edificatory perfectionism],”​[2]​ the answer is that the respect due to every human adult of sound mind is the valuable aspect of freedom on which my sweeping pronouncement is centered.  Yet Sher proceeds to declare that “the burden of supporting that sweeping [pronouncement] will fall entirely on the third form of content-independent value, which Kramer calls constitutive.”​[3]​  Sher is in effect contending that the deontological component of my critique of edificatory perfectionism rests on one major element in the consequentialist component of my critique.  Hardly surprising is that he finds such a position unsatisfactory, but it is not my position.  Although the fifth chapter of my book does deplore the tendency of edificatory perfectionists to overlook or discount the consequentialist aspects of freedom’s value, no invocations of those aspects can ever vindicate the proposition that the use of coercion or manipulation in furtherance of edificatory perfectionism is always and everywhere morally wrong.  Accordingly, my sweeping affirmation of that proposition – to which Sher takes exception – is focused not on consequentialist concerns but on the deontological concern which I share with Quong and other Rawlsians.
	That Sher has missed the deontological character of one main strand in Chapter 5 of my book is further evident from the fact that he contrasts Chapter 5 with Chapter 6 by adverting to the deontological tenor of the latter.  Chapter 6 is indeed thoroughly deontological, but so too is the aforementioned strand of Chapter 5.  A contrast between consequentialism and deontology is within my fifth chapter as well as between that chapter and the succeeding one.  Most important among the differences between those chapters is that, whereas the deontological critique in Chapter 5 is largely coextensive with Rawlsianism in its condemnation of edificatory perfectionism, the deontological critique in Chapter 6 is aimed especially at the policies of edificatory perfectionism which the Rawlsians are not positioned to impugn tellingly.  With a focus on the quidnunc mentality of edificatory perfectionism, my sixth chapter assails the policies of such perfectionism not only when they involve coercion or manipulation but also when they involve neither of those freedom-restricting factors.
	Sher recognizes that the deontological moorings of Chapter 6 are not Kantian, but he errs when he suggests that my outlook is “an amalgam of deontology and virtue theory.”​[4]​  In two main respects, the partial assimilation of my position to that of virtue theorists is misleading at best.  First, contemporary virtue-ethical theories are predominantly Aristotelian.  As is indicated at a number of junctures in Liberalism with Excellence, the tradition from which my critique of edificatory perfectionism emanates is Stoical rather than Aristotelian.  Though I deliberately refrain from tying that critique to any specific Stoical doctrines, the Stoical emphasis on self-restraint as integral to self-mastery and self-respect is operative throughout the sixth chapter.  Second, whereas the proponents of virtue ethics are centrally concerned with traits of character, my critique of the quidnunc mentality of edificatory perfectionism concentrates fundamentally instead on the features of edificatory-perfectionist policies themselves and on the features of a system of governance that adopts and implements such policies.  Though I naturally discuss the actions of the officials who run a system of governance, my aim in doing so is always chiefly to shed light on the tenor of the system rather than on the characters of the officials.  It is the tenor of the system that crucially bears on the levels of self-respect which citizens are warranted in harboring.
	Sher further goes astray when he suggests that I might “understand [the policies of edificatory perfectionism] as incorporating an essential reference to the agents who are pursuing them. If my aim is not that you live in a way that is good, but rather that you live in a certain way because I think it good, then there is a clear sense in which I am trying to elevate myself by imposing my will on you.”​[5]​  Were edificatory perfectionism guilty of the justificatory bootstrapping that is described in this quotation, it would of course be a deeply objectionable doctrine.  However, as I have stated emphatically in my book,​[6]​ edificatory perfectionists are not in fact guilty of such bootstrapping.  Neither the Rawlsians nor I have ever suggested otherwise.  Thus, Sher is battling against a straw man when he tentatively attributes to me the line of criticism encapsulated in this latest quotation.  My complaints about the self-aggrandizement involved in edificatory perfectionism are focused not on justificatory bootstrapping but instead on meddlesomeness.
	When Sher moves on to assail aspirational perfectionism, one of his contentions is that funding or other support by the public sector will very seldom if ever be necessary for promoting the modes of excellence which I envisage.  On the one hand, as I repeatedly state in the final two chapters of my book, the requisite degree of governmental support for the fostering of excellence is an empirical matter that will vary from society to society.  In some credibly possible societies, little or no public funding will be needed – because the funding available from private sources will be adequate.  On the other hand, the most striking example of excellence adduced by Sher is indicative of the likelihood that in manifold actual societies the involvement of the public sector will be crucial.  Nearly 90% of the funding for the Houston Astrodome came from the public sector, and the construction or restoration of other major venues for sporting events in the United States has likewise very often been heavily reliant on the coffers of state and local governments.
	Some of the rest of what Sher says about aspirational perfectionism is fully consistent with what I have said in my book.  For example, he correctly maintains that the level of self-respect warranted for a particular individual can be greatly increased by the striving of that individual to exert and stretch many of her capabilities – even if her capabilities are quite modest in comparison with those of most other people.  Such a contention tallies nicely with my repeated observation that the conduct of any individual is always the most important determinant of the level of self-respect that is warranted for him or her.  One’s life marked by fruitful efforts to enhance one’s abilities can be an admirable life even if one’s abilities are unexceptional.  Likewise congruent with what I have written in my book is Sher’s emphasis on the multiplicity of modes of excellence.  Time and again in the final two chapters of the book, I lay stress on that very multiplicity.
	However, the other portions of Sher’s comments on aspirational perfectionism are much more dubious.  For example, let us scrutinize the following passage:
To include achievement among the necessary conditions for warranted self-respect is to imply that a person [is] not fully entitled to think well of himself unless he or his society is fortunate enough to have achieved a high score on some suitable scale of excellence. This is a hard saying, in that it excludes the vast majority of unexceptional people – laborers, clerks, stay-at-home parents – who have had the bad luck to be born into impoverished or benighted societies.​[7]​
At least two main shortcomings mar this passage.  First, and less important, Sher here ignores my penultimate chapter’s remarks about the commendableness of struggling against adversity.  Someone born into difficult circumstances can rise above those circumstances by struggling successfully to improve her society as well as by struggling successfully to improve her own life and the lives of those around her.  Second, and more important, Sher here appears to conceive of warranted self-respect as a binary non-scalar property.  That is, he appears to think that warranted self-respect exists in an all-or-nothing fashion rather than by degrees.  That he adheres to some such conception of warranted self-respect is further apparent from the following sentence, which occurs almost immediately after the passage that has just been quoted: “Thus, it seems no less dubious to maintain that a low achiever in a low achieving society is not warranted in fully respecting himself than it is to maintain that such a low achiever is unlikely fully to respect himself.”​[8]​  Exactly what is meant by the notion of full self-respect is not clear, but the property denoted by that notion is evidently non-scalar.  Anything short of full self-respect is not full self-respect.
	In the seventh chapter of my book, I argue against any conception of self-respect or warranted self-respect as a non-scalar property.  The quantum of self-respect that is warranted for each person can be more ample or less ample, and the aim of distinctively aspirational-perfectionist policies is to bring about the social and political and economic conditions under which each person can be warranted in harboring a strong sense of self-respect.  (Throughout the closing chapters of my book, I deliberately employ vague adjectives such as “solid” and “strong” and “ample” and “high” and “robust” and “hearty” to characterize the relevant magnitude and resilience of the warranted self-respect.  Though I will somewhat precisify that characterization in A Stoical Theory of Justice – the sequel to Liberalism with Excellence – a substantial degree of vagueness will remain.  No very precise characterization is either possible or desirable.)
	Hence, if Sher is indeed presuming that warranted self-respect is a non-scalar property, he is pro tanto talking past me rather than engaging with the discussions of warranted self-respect and aspirational perfectionism in Liberalism with Excellence.  Even more problematic and bewildering is the following pronouncement: “If what justice requires is that the state provide each citizen with a warrant for full self-respect, and if the point of promoting achievement is that agents are not fully warranted in respecting themselves unless they have the sense of effective agency that only their own past successes can provide, then whatever excellence the wider society has managed to achieve is neither here nor there.”​[9]​  One puzzle here is that Sher again invokes the mysterious non-scalar property of full self-respect.  Even more bemusing, however, is that the point which he associates with the promotion of achievement bears no resemblance or connection to my aspirational-perfectionist rationale for the promotion of excellence.  Were there any significant resemblance or connection, the problem which Sher envisages here for aspirational perfectionism would doubtless be genuine.  However, since there is no such resemblance or connection, the problem which he broaches is illusory.
	Sher errs further when he refers to “Kramer’s claim that what is owed to each citizen as a matter of justice is not self-respect but only its warrant.”​[10]​  Again Sher treats of self-respect as a non-scalar property, but even worse is that he has subtly yet far-reachingly misstated the claim which he purports to recount.  Under the doctrine of aspirational perfectionism, neither a high level of self-respect nor warrant for a high level of self-respect is owed to each citizen as a matter of justice.  Rather, what is owed to each citizen as a matter of justice is the securing of social and political and economic conditions under which each citizen can be warranted in enjoying a high level of self-respect.  No government can ensure, nor should any government seek to ensure, that each person in a society actually harbors a hearty sense of self-respect.  Likewise, no government can ensure – nor should any government seek to ensure – that a hearty sense of self-respect is warranted for each person in a society.  As I state at several junctures in the final few chapters of my book, the level of self-respect actually experienced by any person P is principally dependent on P’s own conduct and temperament, and the level of self-respect that is warranted for P is principally dependent on P’s own conduct.  Sundry other contingencies beyond the control of any liberal-democratic system of governance, including most notably the actions and decisions of many other people, also bear significantly on the sizeableness of P’s actual self-respect and on the sizeableness of the self-respect which P is warranted in harboring.  Consequently, although the social and economic and political factors that can be suitably influenced by a system of governance are crucial in affecting P’s situation, numerous other factors are vital as well.
	Proceeding from the mistaken understanding of aspirational perfectionism encapsulated in the latest quotation above, Sher chides me for not going even further.  He holds that, instead of thinking merely that a system of governance is morally obligated to provide each person with a warrant for a solid sense of self-respect, I should think additionally that such a system is morally obligated to ensure that each person actually experiences a warrantedly solid sense of self-respect.  (Sher does not in fact indicate that the solid sense of self-respect should be warranted, but his suggestion would be especially outlandish if it were construed as omitting that element.)  In other words, Sher is reprimanding me for not advancing a doctrine of aspirational perfectionism that is a version of edificatory perfectionism.  Given that the ideal of justice which he commends is both wildly unattainable and deeply illiberal, his suggestion tends to confirm my worries about edificatory perfectionism.

II.  Replies to Han van Wietmarschen

Though Han van Wietmarschen’s philosophical outlook is very different from that of Sher, his article begins with an error that is similar to the error which I have addressed at the close of my replies to Sher.  On the opening page of his article, van Wietmarschen announces that “Kramer does not provide an acceptable account of why the presence of various excellences in a political society provides all citizens of that society with warrant for self-respect.”​[11]​  Though this quoted statement is logically consistent with the fact that I have not endeavored to provide any account of the kind which van Wietmarschen mentions, it strongly suggests – as a pragmatic implicature – that I have so endeavored.  In general, criticism of a person Q for not having supplied an acceptable account of some state of affairs is misleading if Q has denied that any such state of affairs obtains.  Thus, the quoted statement can most plausibly be construed as indicating that I have aspired to explain why “the presence of various excellences in a political society provides all citizens of that society with warrant for self-respect.”  In that event, van Wietmarschen has misunderstood the central aim of aspirational perfectionism – which consists not in supplying each citizen with a warrant for a hearty sense of self-respect, but instead in furnishing the social and economic and political conditions under which each citizen can be warranted in feeling a hearty sense of self-respect.  Whether any particular citizen is actually warranted in feeling such a sense of self-respect will depend also on other factors (most notably his or her own doings).
	Like Sher, van Wietmarschen apparently conceives of self-respect as a non-scalar property.  He leaves his conception unexplicated, and he does not defend it against the objections which I have posed in my book to any such understanding of self-respect.  Accordingly, although some of the observations and queries in his article are pertinent, quite a few of them are misguided or beside the point.​[12]​
	Even allowing for the simplifications involved in outlining a lengthy argument that has been propounded by someone else, van Wietmarschen’s sketch of my argument for aspirational perfectionism (at the outset of section II of his article) teems with misrepresentations and infelicities.  The infelicities begin with his reference to “Kramer’s aspirational perfectionist argument for state funding for the arts, sciences, and culture.”​[13]​  Though this wording does not logically entail the proposition that the doctrine of aspirational perfectionism is focused solely on the three broad areas of human endeavor mentioned here, it strongly conveys the impression that that doctrine is so focused.  Any such impression is baseless, for – as I have mentioned in my reply to Sher – I in fact repeatedly stress the multifariousness of the areas of human endeavor in which excellence can be achieved.  The arts, sciences, and culture are hugely important areas, but they are by no means the only areas.
	Objectionable in three main ways is the third premise in van Wietmarschen’s delineation of my argument: “[T]he excellence of one’s fellow citizens provides warrant for self-respect.”​[14]​  First, although the wording of the premise is ambiguous, the phrase “the excellence of one’s fellow citizens” can easily lead readers to suppose that aspirational perfectionism is a variety of edificatory perfectionism.  Second, and more important, the quoted premise is one of many parts of van Wietmarschen’s article in which self-respect is presented as a non-scalar property.  Third, the formulated premise repeats the mistake to which I have objected in the antepenultimate paragraph above.  That is, it wrongly implies that proponents of aspirational perfectionism aim to ensure that each citizen has warrant for feeling an ample sense of self-respect.   The first two of these three failings also afflict the next premise in van Wietmarschen’s sketch of my argument: “[T]he excellence of one’s fellow citizens is necessary for the full warrantedness of one’s self-respect.”​[15]​
	Van Wietmarschen’s distillation of a fifth premise repeats some of the errors in his distillations of the earlier premises: “State funding for the arts, sciences, and culture can promote excellence in individual members of a society.”​[16]​  Such phrasing conveys the erroneous impression that aspirational perfectionism is concerned with only a few modes of excellence, and it likewise conveys the erroneous impression that aspirational perfectionism is a species of edificatory perfectionism.
	In short, van Wietmarschen’s outline of my argument for aspirational perfectionism is a buzzing hive of distortion and confusion.  To be sure, readers already familiar with my book can construe his formulations with sufficient generosity to avoid the misunderstandings which those formulations invite.  However, someone who purports to synopsize my argument should not be relying on his readers to have acquainted themselves already with the lines of reasoning that are being summarized.
	Van Wietmarschen’s article does improve after its error-strewn adumbration of my argument for aspirational perfectionism, but it contains a number of other missteps.  For example, van Wietmarschen adds a baseless gloss to a portion of a sentence from my book: “On Kramer’s view, ‘a person with a warranted sense of self-respect will have attained that sense positively by reference to what she is and does,’ not by reference to what others think of what one is or does.”​[17]​  His completely unfounded gloss obscures a key point of intersection between aspirational perfectionism and Rawlsianism.  As is repeatedly stated in the closing chapters of my book, the level of self-respect that is warranted for each person is affected by social and economic and political conditions.  If those conditions are such that somebody is widely regarded with contempt or other negative attitudes, she will usually be warranted in lowering her level of self-respect pro tanto.  For example, suppose that Donald is inaccurately but very widely believed to have engaged in paedophilia or other odious behavior.  Quite apart from any hardships such as incarceration or persecution that might be inflicted on Donald as a result of people’s perceptions of him, those perceptions are themselves sufficient to warrant his concluding that his life has gone worse by dint of the obloquy with which he is viewed.  In other words, those perceptions on the part of his fellow citizens are sufficient to warrant his lowering of his sense of self-respect.  Far from being at odds with aspirational perfectionism, my verdict concerning this matter tallies nicely with the emphasis of aspirational perfectionism on the social bases of self-respect.  (Though my understanding of the social bases of self-respect is broader than Rawls’s, it includes the Rawlsian understanding – apart from Rawls’s commitment to his own principles of justice.)
	Of course, not every situation marked by inappositely negative attitudes on the part of other people is such as to warrant the lowering of someone’s level of self-respect.  For example, insofar as the musicologists in the era of Beethoven were sneeringly unable to appreciate his final string quartets, he was warranted in concluding that his genius had carried him far ahead of his time.  Instead of being warranted in attenuating his sense of self-respect, he was warranted in elevating it.  Still, although not every situation of widespread animosity toward oneself on the part of one’s contemporaries will warrant the weakening of one’s sense of self-respect, many situations of that type do warrant such an upshot.  Those situations are relevantly similar to the plight of Donald.  Pace van Wietmarschen, those situations are perfectly well covered by the conception of self-respect that is operative in aspirational perfectionism.
	When van Wietmarschen turns to attacking the central theses of aspirational perfectionism in §IV of his article, his effort is marred by the failings which I have already identified in his formulation of the third premise of the argument which he attributes to me.  Time and again, he refers to self-respect or warranted self-respect as if it were a non-scalar property.  Consider, for example, the following remark near the beginning of that section of his article: “The immediate question, of course, is how the excellence of, say, Rineke Dijkstra’s photography provides me, as a fellow Dutch citizen, with warrant for my self-respect.”​[18]​
	Van Wietmarschen proceeds to mount an argument against aspirational perfectionism that should be quoted at some length:
[T]here may be many things that would make a person’s life go well, but which are not part of that person’s plan of life or conception of the good…. If this is right, then even if how well my life goes depends partly on the quality of my fellow citizens’ lives, it does not follow that their excellences provide me with warrant for self-respect. If, for example, the fact that Rineke Dijkstra takes excellent pictures makes my life, as a fellow Dutch citizen, better than it otherwise would be, it doesn’t follow that this fact provides me with warrant for self-respect. After all, being the fellow citizen of a great photographer may not be any part of my reasonable or rational plan of life or conception of the good. There is a gap between warrant for the claim that my life is going well, and warrant for the claim that my plan of life or conception of the good is valuable or worth carrying out.​[19]​
Though van Wietmarschen gives no hint of the fact, the line of thought articulated in this passage is addressed in more than one way by my book.  In the first place, van Wietmarschen inappositely writes as if I were invoking exactly the same conception of self-respect that was invoked by Rawls.  As I state at multiple junctures, my conception of self-respect is somewhat broader than Rawls’s (though it is bolstered by some other parts of Rawls’s main books, especially by the long final chapter of A Theory of Justice).  More important, although the two claims enunciated in the closing sentence of this passage from van Wietmarschen’s article are not equivalent, the notion of a gap between them is singularly misleading – even under Rawls’s conception of self-respect, but especially under my conception.  If Julia is warranted in thinking that her life is going well through occurrences other than her own pursuit of her conception of the good, she is also warranted in thinking that any successes in her pursuit of her conception of the good will be contributing to a life that is especially flourishing overall.  She is warranted in thinking that, far from being dragged down by the other elements of her life, she is being lifted up by them.  Consequently, she is warranted in feeling ever more strongly her “sense of [her] own value, [her] secure conviction that [her] conception of [her] good, [her] plan of life, is worth carrying out.”​[20]​  In these circumstances, the warrant for the reinforcement of her conviction about the worthiness of pursuing her conception of the good is not due to her having any grounds for believing that the elements of her conception of the good have become more valuable than previously in relation to any number of desiderata which she forgoes.  Instead, the warrant is due to her having grounds for believing that her pursuit of her conception of the good will be taking place in the context of her thriving rather than in the context of her languishing.
	Van Wietmarschen submits that, under my conception of warranted self-respect, “[w]hat counts as [a person’s] life going well, and what counts as warrant for the sense that her life is going well, is not, however, in turn governed by her own rational plan of life or conception of the good.”​[21]​  If the phrase “governed by” is to be construed as “fully determined by” or “controlled by,” then what van Wietmarschen says here is true under any account of self-respect or warranted self-respect that is at least minimally credible.  There is nothing peculiar about my account of warranted self-respect in that regard.  Contrariwise, if “governed by” is instead to be construed as “heavily influenced by,” then what van Wietmarschen says here is false under my account of warranted self-respect and under any other such account that is at least minimally credible.
	We can best mull over this matter by considering the two main ways in which the adoption and pursuit of a certain conception of the good by Julia can detract from the level of self-respect which she is warranted in sustaining.  First, the conception of the good to which she adheres can be intrinsically unworthy, perhaps because its content is immoral or perhaps because its content is demeaningly vapid.  Second, the conception of the good to which she adheres can be ill-suited to her aptitudes, either because its overambitiousness ensures that her pursuit of it will be futile or because its underambitiousness ensures that her pursuit of it will leave her with achievements far below those of which she is capable.  By any of these routes, Julia through her embrace of a conception of the good can impair the degree of self-respect which she is warranted in feeling.  Conversely, of course, her adoption and pursuit of a conception of the good that avoids the faults mentioned here will pro tanto heighten the level of self-respect which she is warranted in harboring.  Though other factors also influence that warranted level of self-respect, her own conduct – her conduct in staking out and pursuing a conception of the good and in upholding or flouting principles of justice – is a more significant influence than is anything else.  I repeatedly state as much in Liberalism with Excellence.
	At any rate, the phrase “governed by” is apparently to be construed in neither of the ways suggested above.  Apparently, van Wietmarschen is using that phrase to mean “necessarily recognizable within.”  Immediately after the sentence just quoted, he writes: “For example, the photographic excellence produced by Dutch funding for the arts makes my life go better, and provides warrant for my sense that my life is going well, even if my rational plan of life or conception of the good rejects photography as a worthless and deceitful endeavor.  Given this understanding of a warranted sense of my life going well, it is not rational for me to want this regardless of my particular plan of life or conception of the good.”​[22]​  As van Wietmarschen makes explicit, he is here attacking my claim that warranted self-respect is a primary natural good in Rawls’s sense.  However, his attack is based on his failure to differentiate between one’s warrant for a high level of self-respect and one’s warranted self-respect.  At no point do I suggest that one’s warrant for a high level of self-respect is a primary good in Rawls’s sense.  What I instead correctly maintain is that one’s warranted self-respect is a primary natural good in Rawls’s sense.  (By contrast, sheer self-respect – which might be grossly unwarranted in its extent or its orientation – is not a primary good in Rawls’s sense.)  Whereas van Wietmarschen’s worry would have been germane if I had claimed that one’s warrant for a high level of self-respect is a primary good in Rawls’s sense, his remarks do not cast any doubt on the proposition that one’s warranted self-respect is a primary natural good in Rawls’s sense.  That latter proposition is what I have affirmed.
	Concluding his attack on my classification of warranted self-respect as a primary natural good in Rawls’s sense, van Wietmarschen asserts that I have committed myself to a “straightforwardly perfectionist view according to which the state properly aims to provide citizens with warranted self-respect, where self-respect is understood to include a sense of one’s life going well, and warrant for this sense is provided by facts which make one’s life going well, and where what makes one’s life going well is not a function of one’s own rational plan of life or conception of the good.”​[23]​  This latest pronouncement by van Wietmarschen has misfired in three major ways.  First, he again errs in stating that the aim of an aspirational-perfectionist system of governance is to “provide citizens with warranted self-respect.”  As I have declared repeatedly in Liberalism with Excellence, warranted self-respect is not a distribuendum.  Warranted self-respect is a primary natural good rather than a primary social good.  Second, van Wietmarschen likewise stumbles by asserting that – under my conception of warranted self-respect – “what makes one’s life going well is not a function of one’s own rational plan of life or conception of the good.”  To be sure, the goodness of one’s life is not fully determined or controlled by one’s adoption and pursuit of one’s conception of the good, and it might not be fully recognizable within one’s own outlook.  Nonetheless, as I have already remarked here and in my book, the goodness of one’s life is heavily influenced by one’s adoption and pursuit of one’s conception of the good.  Third, van Wietmarschen again goes astray by taking himself to have shown that warranted self-respect is not aptly classifiable as a Rawlsian primary good.  What he says is sufficient to establish that one’s warrant for a high level of self-respect is not a Rawlsian primary good, but I have never suggested otherwise.  Instead of averring or presuming that one’s warrant for a high level of self-respect is a Rawlsian primary good, I have contended that warranted self-respect is such a good.  (I will say much more about this matter in my replies to Billingham and Taylor.)
	Though the final main section of van Wietmarschen’s article commits en passant some of the errors that have already been discussed, the main objectionable feature of the section is that it purports to be directed against me.  In fact, the thesis propounded there by van Wietmarschen – his thesis that the sustainment of liberal-democratic institutions is a precious mode of excellence – is a proposition for which I argue over the course of several pages in my book.​[24]​  (Mystifyingly, van Wietmarschen in a footnote cites only the final page of the relevant ruminations in my book.​[25]​)  Moreover, not only have I lengthily made the very point which van Wietmarschen professes to be directing against me, but I have added to it a further point which he and other high-minded Rawlsians seldom deign to notice.  That is, I have observed that the sustainment of liberal-democratic institutions and of other modes of excellence is something that requires considerable expenditures of resources.  When we are seeking to gauge whether the resources for those other modes of excellence can better come from the private sector or from the public sector, one major consideration in favor of the latter is that the provision of public funding can help to warrant a sense of collective responsibility among people for the social bases of self-respect.​[26]​  Collective responsibility of that type might be too banausic to receive attention from most of the loftily high-minded Rawlsians, but aspirational perfectionists can recognize the importance of the collective credit that attaches to people in their roles as taxpayers – along with the importance of the collective credit that attaches to people in their roles as constituents of politicians who conduct deliberations and arrive at policies in the institutions of liberal democracy.

III.  Replies to Paul Billingham and Anthony Taylor

I turn now to the deftly nuanced and incisive article by Billingham and Taylor.  With regard to the first half of their article, I have only one concern.  As I have already said in my replies to Sher, Chapter 5 of my book should have distinguished more sharply between the consequentialist strand and the deontological strand of my animadversions on the illiberality of edificatory perfectionism.  Given that readers as adroit and meticulous as Billingham and Taylor have altogether overlooked the deontological component of Chapter 5, it is clear that my deontological queries about the edificatory perfectionists’ neglect of the value of freedom should not have been pursued so closely in tandem with my consequentialist queries about that neglect.
	Let it be noted, then, that the three types of content-independent value which Billingham and Taylor recount in §II(A) of their article are the three types of consequentialist value which I delineate in the fifth chapter of Liberalism with Excellence.  That chapter’s focus on those types of value is combined with its focus on a key deontological aspect of the value of freedoms: the value of freedoms as manifestations of respect.  As I have remarked in my replies to Sher, the latter focus aligns my fifth chapter with the complaints advanced by Rawlsians such as Quong about edificatory perfectionism.

A.  No Guarantee of Warrant or of Warranted Self-Respect
Because there is virtually nothing else with which I disagree in the first half of the Billingham/Taylor article, I shall move on straightaway to §III.  My concerns about the second half of their article are multiple.  First, although their wording is often ambiguous and is thus susceptible to being generously construed at quite a few junctures, there are some junctures at which they definitely conflate (i) one’s having warrant for a strong sense of self-respect and (ii) one’s warranted harboring of a strong sense of self-respect.  Someone can have warrant for a strong sense of self-respect even if he or she does not in fact feel such a sense, whereas nobody can warrantedly harbor a strong sense of self-respect unless he or she feels such a sense.
	As I have already observed, the distinctive aim of an aspirational-perfectionist system of governance is to secure the political and social and economic conditions wherein every member of a society can be warranted in sustaining an ample sense of self-respect.  Such a system of governance does not aim to ensure that everyone actually possesses warrant for an ample sense of self-respect, and a fortiori it does not aim to ensure that everyone warrantedly harbors such a sense.  As has already been stated, the level of self-respect that is warranted for each person P is chiefly determined by the conduct and achievements of P.  Likewise, the level of self-respect that is warrantedly felt by P is chiefly determined by the conduct and achievements and temperament of P.
	Consequently, Billingham and Taylor go amiss when they impugn the theses of aspirational perfectionism by asserting that “citizens might be guaranteed a sufficiently high level of warranted self-respect by the realization of justice, even in the absence of further cultural or social excellences.  For Rawls, citizens of a well-ordered society would have a sufficient sense of self-respect.”​[27]​  Such a rejoinder to the doctrine of aspirational perfectionism presumes that the proponents of that doctrine are seeking to guarantee a sufficiently high level of warranted self-respect for each person.  Billingham and Taylor similarly err when they attribute to aspirational perfectionism the thesis that “[c]itizens in a just society that exhibits multifarious excellences have a higher level of warranted self-respect than those in a just society lacking such achievements.”​[28]​  Also mistaken is their ascription to me of the proposition that “the government has a duty to ensure that citizens’ level of warranted self-respect reaches some sufficiency threshold.”​[29]​  In these statements and at several further junctures, Billingham and Taylor slip into writing as if aspirational perfectionists suppose that warranted self-respect is a primary social good.  Warranted self-respect is instead a primary natural good that is never directly a distribuendum under any principles of justice.

B.  Warranted Self-Respect (Unlike Warrant for Ample Self-Respect) is a Primary Good
Second, my most far-reaching disagreement with Billingham and Taylor is over the proposition that warranted self-respect is indeed a primary good in Rawls’s sense.  I here return at greater length to a matter addressed in my comments on van Wietmarschen’s article.  Let us recall that a Rawlsian primary good is an all-purpose desideratum in that it will be generally serviceable for the realization of any person’s ends regardless of what those ends might be.​[30]​  Now, warranted self-respect consists of two main properties: it is self-respect, and it is warranted.  Given as much, warranted self-respect is a primary natural good in Rawls’s sense – whereas sheer self-respect, which might be grossly unwarranted in its magnitude or orientation, is not.  Like self-respect, and unlike warranted self-respect, warrant for a high level of self-respect is not a Rawlsian primary good.  Someone can have warrant for a high level of self-respect even if the grounds for her having that warrant are very tenuously connected to the ends which she sets for herself.  Thus, although an aspirational-perfectionist system of governance is aiming to provide the political and social and economic conditions wherein everyone can be warranted in sustaining an ample sense of self-respect, the primary natural good which it seeks to promote is neither self-respect nor warrant for high levels of self-respect; instead, that primary natural good is warranted self-respect.
	Billingham and Taylor advance two main lines of reasoning in support of their contention that warranted self-respect is not a primary good.  Let us examine each of those lines of reasoning (in the inverse of the order in which Billingham and Taylor marshal them).

1.  The Concretization of Excellence
Billingham and Taylor correctly observe that an aspirational-perfectionist system of governance has to select for its society (i) the areas of endeavor on which public funds will be bestowed to promote the occurrence of outstanding achievements and (ii) the specific types of projects that are to be subsidized within each of those areas.  At the philosophical level at which I write, the net is cast very widely.  Billingham and Taylor think that I have excluded religious practices as potential sites of excellence,​[31]​ but I have done no such thing.  They mention my passing reference to the illegitimacy of a government’s endeavoring to increase attendance at Baptist services,​[32]​ but I advanced that brief comment in a context where I was assuming that the purpose of the government’s support would be edificatory or purely sectarian.  No broad inference about the exclusion of religious practices and institutions is derivable.  On the contrary, although I am robustly atheistic, the fact that I have worked for more than three decades on a Biblical commentary as my principal avocation is something that has helped to attune me to the potential excellence of religious striving and practices.​[33]​
	Billingham and Taylor note my view that the identification of areas of endeavor and of specific types of projects within those areas should be consigned to the legislative stage of justice.​[34]​  However, they misapprehend my reasons for taking such a view.  The point is certainly not that decisions reached at the legislative stage are guaranteed to be correct by virtue of having been reached there.  Rather, the points are twofold.  In the first place, the modes of excellence to be fostered through public funding are best identified in a context where proponents of the sundry modes have opportunities to press their arguments for the inclusion of their favored activities.  Even more important, the areas of striving that are most suitable for the conferral of public support in any particular society – along with the specific types of undertakings within those areas – are best identified in a context where ample empirical information about the resources and talents and other peculiarities of that society is known.  Though the crucial decisions to be reached are of course evaluative, their soundness will also depend on solid empirical bearings.  Precisely because the potential modes of excellence are so varied at a general level, many different combinations of such modes can be suitable.  Choosing among them is an enterprise for the legislative stage and beyond.
	What really underlies the worries of Billingham and Taylor about the concretization of excellence is the fact that the processes of concretization cannot remain within the constraints of Rawlsian public reason.  Throughout my book, I indicate that aspirational perfectionism does indeed transgress the confines of Rawlsian public reason.  However, Billingham and Taylor go awry when they contend that “the fact that warrant will be concretized on the basis of reasonably rejectable claims about excellence is enough to prevent warranted self-respect from being a primary good.”​[35]​  Warranted self-respect is indeed a primary natural good in Rawls’s sense – it is something of which the parties in the Original Position would “prefer more rather than less”​[36]​ – and the fact that it has to be concretized partly on the basis of reasonably rejectable claims does not distinguish it from the other Rawlsian primary goods.  Consider, for example, the rights and liberties which Rawls grouped together as the primary social goods that are covered by his first principle of justice.  Anyone familiar with the juridical and societal debates over the contents of constitutional rights and liberties will know that those rights and liberties have to be concretized on the basis of reasonably rejectable claims about their contents.  Thus, unless Billingham and Taylor are prepared to deny that the desiderata covered by Rawls’s first principle of justice are primary social goods, they will need to drop the line of reasoning encapsulated in my latest quotation from them.  I realize of course that Rawlsians such as Quong have sought to differentiate between disagreements over matters of justice and disagreements over matters of the good,​[37]​ but Quong’s contrast between justificatory disputes and foundational disputes is unavailing as a refuge for Billingham and Taylor.  For one thing, the promotion of warranted self-respect is a matter of justice.  More important, neither the disagreements over the concretization of excellence nor the disagreements over the concretization of the basic rights and liberties are foundational disputes in Quong’s sense.  In each case, rather, the people locked in disagreement share certain key premises that serve as the justificatory foci for their wrangling.  People in a well-ordered society will recognize that warranted self-respect and the basic rights and liberties are primary goods, and they will orient themselves toward that shared recognition even while they disagree over the concretization of those goods.
	Billingham and Taylor try to bolster their attack on my classification of warranted self-respect as a primary good, by submitting that my line of reasoning about the concretization of warranted self-respect could be unfurled mutatis mutandis in support of the classification of well-being as a primary good:
Consider an analogy with ‘well-being’. One might plausibly argue that all reasonable citizens can recognise the value of well-being, understood formally, or at a high level of abstraction. All citizens wish to enjoy a high level of well-being, since all rational plans of life include well-being within their understanding of the good. This is not enough for well-being to count as a primary good, however. Indeed, well-being is ruled out from being a primary good precisely because policies that implement the pursuit of well-being at the legislative stage will rest upon conceptions of well-being, such as hedonism or objective list accounts, that many reasonable citizens reject.​[38]​
Contrary to what Billingham and Taylor assert, there are ample reasons at a philosophical level of abstraction for denying that well-being is a primary good.  Worth noting is that those reasons broadly resemble the reasons for denying that self-respect – which Billingham and Taylor believe to be a primary good – is such a good.  Robert Nozick’s scenario of the experience machine and other scenarios involving the unfoundedness of well-being are prominent in the philosophical literature.  Well-being as such, which can be grossly unwarranted in its magnitude or its orientation, is no primary good in the Rawlsian sense.  It can be inimical to the realization of one’s ends as plausibly as it can be promotive of their realization.

2.  Why Excellences Other than the Excellence of a Liberal Democracy?
Somewhat earlier in their article, Billingham and Taylor ask why anything beyond the sustainment of a justly liberal-democratic system of governance in a society would be needed among the political and social and economic conditions under which every member of the society can be warranted in harboring an ample sense of self-respect.  “[I]t is not clear why the government would be obligated to promote and facilitate…manifold modes of societal excellence.  After all, citizens might be guaranteed a sufficiently high level of warranted self-respect by the realization of justice, even in the absence of further cultural or social excellences.”​[39]​  Let us leave aside here my already-voiced complaints about the misstep by Billingham and Taylor in thinking that aspirational perfectionism aims to guarantee some level of warranted self-respect for each person.  Even when that error is remedied, their query piquantly remains.  Why would not the excellence of a justly liberal-democratic system of governance itself be enough to constitute the political and social and economic conditions in which each person can be warranted in feeling a strong sense of self-respect?  As Billingham and Taylor make clear, I myself attach enormous importance to that mode of excellence in my book (and in many further writings of mine).  Why would not other modes of excellence simply be icing on the cake, which a system of governance is not obligated to foster as a matter of justice?
	One thing which Liberalism with Excellence shares with Rawlsian liberalism is its egalitarian insistence that the primary natural goods are to be promoted – not guaranteed or distributed, but promoted – for everyone alike.  As my book repeatedly states, and as has been stated also in this article, the paramount aim of aspirational perfectionism is to bring about the political and social and economic conditions in which every member of a society can be warranted in feeling a hearty sense of self-respect.  Now, among the members of a society, the level of self-respect that is warranted for anyone will be influenced most heavily by what he or she has done.  In a typical situation, some of the members of the society will be much more accomplished than others, and most members will be at intermediate degrees of accomplishment.  For the people toward the top end of the scale of personal achievement, the fostering of excellence beyond the sustainment of a liberal-democratic system of governance will very likely be icing on the cake.  Significantly further down that scale, however, the level of self-respect that is warranted for each person will require more and more bolstering from the general excellence of the society if that level is to remain ample.​[40]​  Of course, almost inevitably, the levels warranted for some citizens will not be ample – perhaps because those citizens have devoted their lives to wrongdoing or perhaps because their projects have been blighted by dismal failures.  An aspirational-perfectionist system of governance does not and cannot provide any guarantees against such outcomes.  What it can and should do, however, is to supply the political and economic and social conditions under which the prospect of being warranted in enjoying a hearty sense of self-respect is meaningfully available to every citizen.  For that purpose, such a system of governance has to take into account the likely spread of personal achievements.
	The appropriate quantities of resources that should be devoted to the fostering of excellence in any particular society are something that cannot be specified in abstracto.  Billingham and Taylor are of course correct in declaring that aspirational perfectionism is not a maximizing creed; they are correct in declaring that sufficiency rather than maximality is the guiding touchstone.  However, given the unavoidable vagueness of the concepts on which aspirational perfectionism depends,​[41]​ there is no single talismanic proportion of societal resources that would be uniquely suitable for the realization of aspirational-perfectionist ends in any particular country.  In other words, not only will any society have to select among multiple arrays of modes of excellence that can legitimately be fostered through public funding, but it will also have to select among multiple amounts of overall resources that can legitimately be devoted to the promotion of excellence.  Any of those amounts will constitute a good-faith effort to satisfy the egalitarian insistence that has been summarized in the preceding paragraph.  Normally, a society will fall short of satisfying that insistence if its striving for excellence is confined to the sustainment of a liberal-democratic system of governance.  (Three caveats should be entered here, each of which is connected to points made in my book.  First, if the resources available to a system of governance are too exiguous to support both the operation of a liberal democracy and the fostering of excellence in other domains of endeavor, the former use always takes priority over the latter.  Important though other modes of excellence are as social bases of warranted self-respect, the most important such social base is the operativeness of a liberal democracy.  Second, as I have readily accepted in my book and in my replies to Sher above, there can be societies in which the promotion of excellence through public subventions has been obviated across the board by the availability of abundant private subventions.  Though I doubt that such societies emerge frequently in actuality, the possibility of them is not something that I have ever doubted.  Third, I should also here acknowledge the possibility of countries in relation to which the stance adopted by Billingham and Taylor is largely correct.  Perhaps, for example, Taiwan and Israel are such countries.  Perhaps the sustainment of vibrantly liberal-democratic institutions in the face of extreme external threats is such a monumental achievement that it renders superfluous the pursuit of any other distinctively aspirational-perfectionist policies.)

IV.  Replies to Clare Chambers

In response to the first half of the excellent article by Clare Chambers, I have nothing to add except my hearty agreement.  In response to her discussion of infant male circumcision, however, I have a number of queries.  My unease first arises near the outset of that discussion, when Chambers asserts that “as with the case of abortion, Kramer argues that the purportedly-neutral Nosnipian prohibition is actually not neutral at all.”​[42]​  Here the phrase “as with the case of abortion” conveys the impression that my approach to the issue of circumcision is essentially the same as my approach to the issue of abortion.  My worry about that impression is intensified by Chambers’s subsequent declaration that “I want to challenge Kramer’s position on circumcision….[U]nlike the abortion case, the state can take a side on the matter of policy without taking a side on any matter on which there is reasonable disagreement.”​[43]​  In fact, the problem of abortion and the problem of circumcision are addressed in separate chapters of my book for markedly different purposes.  Whereas the third chapter of Liberalism with Excellence shows that the problem of abortion is what Chambers designates as a “neutralist dilemma” (or what I designate as a “foundational matter of justice”), the second chapter deals with the issue of infant male circumcision not as a neutralist dilemma but instead as an illustration of the complexities involved in statutory interpretation.  At no point do I submit that a neutral solution to the problem of circumcision is unattainable, and indeed – as Chambers herself recounts – I propose such a solution for the counterfactual world of Nosnipia.  Any suggestion that I have treated the issue of infant male circumcision as a neutralist dilemma is unfounded.
	Even more troubling are the arguments by Chambers in favor of suppressing the religious liberty of Jews and Muslims.  Let us begin here with the following premise of hers: “If circumcision is harmful then circumcision of children must be prohibited so as to avoid violating children’s freedom and equality.”​[44]​  In the liberal tradition (not confined to Rawlsianism) in which Chambers purports to write, the harm principle sets forth a necessary condition rather than a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of any governmental interdiction.  Hence, if we assume that the consequent of the conditional in Chambers’s premise holds that the prohibition of infant male circumcision is permissible as well as obligatory, the consequent does not follow perforce from the antecedent.  My devising of the Nosnipian thought-experiment in Chapter 2 of my book is aimed partly at making this very point.  I suppose that, in the counterfactual world of Nosnipia, the best medical evidence indicates that there is a small net detriment associated with the practice of infant male circumcision.  I argue that, given the importance of such circumcision to Judaism and Islam, and given the long history of terrible persecution against Jews and Muslims in Nosnipia (often with particular animosity directed toward the circumcising of males), a blanket legal ban on infant male circumcision in response to the specified medical findings would be morally illegitimate.  Hence, the consequent in Chambers’s conditional does not follow from the antecedent unless the harm mentioned in the antecedent is serious.
	Chambers strangely writes that “[f]or [observant Jews and Muslims], circumcision is not harmful precisely because it is a requirement of religion.”​[45]​  This quoted sentence is baffling.  For observant Jews and Muslims, as for everyone else, the harmfulness or unharmfulness of circumcision is determined not by religious doctrines but by the medical facts.  Immediately following the sentence just quoted is this statement: “The fact that circumcision is a religious tradition is for such people enough to outweigh any purported harms of the practice.”​[46]​  Chambers is here apparently using the preposition “for” to mean “from the perspective of,” and she is propounding a conjecture about the convictions of observant Jews and Muslims.  Whether or not her conjecture is correct, it is irrelevant to the question whether the practice of infant male circumcision can legitimately be proscribed.  The answer to that question hinges not on the conviction ascribed by Chambers to observant Jews and Muslims, but instead on the degree of harmfulness (if any) associated with circumcision.  When people’s religious practices inflict serious harm on others, those practices can legitimately be curtailed or prohibited even though they are religious practices.
	Were the net effect of the practice of infant male circumcision seriously harmful, then, such a practice could legitimately be curtailed or prohibited even for Jews and Muslims.  However, in the actual world, the situation is better than in the counterfactual world of Nosnipia.  In the actual world, the best medical evidence indicates that the net effects of the practice of infant male circumcision are mildly salutary; the small benefits associated with the practice exceed the very small risks involved.  As I remark in a passage of my book which Chambers quotes, this position on the net effects of circumcision has been endorsed by the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Center for Disease Control, and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.  Chambers baselessly asserts that “while Kramer is right about the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), he gives a highly partial account of expert opinion.”​[47]​  What I have said about all three of the major American medical organizations with expertise on this issue is fully accurate.  Chambers observes that the AAP regards the net beneficial effects of the practice of infant male circumcision as too small for the organization to recommend the practice on a routine basis, but her observation to that effect is beside the point – because I have never asserted or implied anything contrary to her observation, and because the modesty of the net beneficial effects hardly converts them into seriously harmful net effects that could legitimately be countered through a legal prohibition on circumcision.
	In a footnote Chambers launches an incendiary attack against the AAP, as she alleges that “the AAP’s discussion of the medical complications and implications of circumcision is skewed strongly towards the practice, in contravention of its own stated recommendation; and it actively recommends that parents make the choice based on cultural and religious reasons rather than medical ones, even though it is a medical organisation not a religious or cultural one.”​[48]​  This accusation by Chambers badly misrepresents the AAP’s position and reasoning.  As she herself mentions in the main text of her article, the AAP does not recommend that infant male circumcision be practiced routinely on medical grounds; in the eyes of the AAP’s members, the net benefits deriving from circumcision are too small to warrant a positive recommendation.  Consequently, the AAP advises that parents who are making decisions about their male offspring should reach affirmative choices only on religious or cultural grounds and not on medical grounds (save in the exceptional cases where the likely medical benefits of circumcision are very large).  Far from being “skewed strongly towards the practice” of male circumcision, the AAP’s advice if generally followed would lead to a substantial reduction in the incidence of infant male circumcision in the United States.  Most non-Jews and non-Muslims would cease to have their male offspring circumcised.
	Chambers has recourse to the British Medical Association (BMA) as her preferred source of medical expertise, but the position of the BMA on the matter of circumcision militates against her crusade on that matter.  The BMA’s position would be supportive of her crusade only if that organization had concluded that the best medical evidence indicates that the practice of infant male circumcision is seriously harmful.  In fact, however, the BMA has not concluded any such thing.  In a passage which Chambers herself quotes, the BMA adopts a squarely noncommittal stance: “There is a spectrum of views within the BMA’s membership about whether non-therapeutic male circumcision is a beneficial, neutral, or harmful procedure or whether it is superfluous, and whether it should ever be done on a child who is not capable of deciding for himself. The medical harms or benefits have not been unequivocally proven.”​[49]​  Elsewhere in the same document, the BMA affirms that “the medical evidence is equivocal” and that “[a]t present,…the medical evidence is inconclusive.”​[50]​  Apparently, Chambers thinks that these repeated proclamations of inconclusiveness – inconclusiveness not about serious harm but about any net harm at all – are sufficient to vindicate the squelching of the religious liberty of Jews and Muslims.  If so, then she is adhering to a strikingly illiberal position.  (Worth noting also is that the BMA’s report on male circumcision was published in 2006, before the latest medical evidence – which has led the major American medical organizations to adopt their current outlook on the matter – had become available.)
	Chambers asserts that “there are a significant number of men who were circumcised as children who regret that fact, and some who experience severe mental distress or physical complications,”​[51]​ but her only substantiation of this claim is a citation to some reports by organizations dedicated to crusading against the practice of male circumcision.  I do not doubt that there are some men who are unhappy about having been circumcised as infants, just as there are innumerable human adults who are unhappy about manifold other aspects of their upbringing (whether those aspects were objectively beneficial or objectively detrimental).  However, even if we leave aside my concern about outright biases in the methodology of the reports on which Chambers relies, those reports do not even begin to address some major difficulties.  For one thing, given that the matter of infant male circumcision is politically significant chiefly as an issue of religious liberty and religious equality, the rate of severe regrets specifically among Jewish and Muslim men is a considerably more important statistic than the rate among men in the general American population.  Moreover, whatever may be the rate of severe regrets among Jewish and Muslim men (a rate which I presume to be extremely low), it has to be compared to the levels of severe regrets among relevant groups of men about other aspects of their upbringing.  For example, when children are fed with an abundance of high-calorie foods while growing up, the fat cells in their bodies will tend to become disproportionately numerous and will thereby irreversibly make them more prone to corpulence in adulthood.  Among adults whose parents regularly indulged them during childhood in the consumption of fattening foods, there might well be quite a high rate of severe regrets about the irreversible proneness to obesity which has been induced in them by that aspect of their upbringing.  (I will return presently to the pitfalls of overeating during childhood.)
	For crusaders against the practice of infant male circumcision who refer to putative regrets among men circumcised as infants, the most formidable difficulty lies in explaining why the sheer occurrence of such regrets is sufficient to vindicate their crusade.  Let us assume arguendo that the rate of regrets among American men circumcised during infancy is approximately as high as some anti-circumcision crusaders suggest (around 10%), and let us ignore both the fact that that figure is not specifically for Jewish or Muslim men and the fact that no distinctions are drawn among levels of severity of the regrets.  Even so, the crusaders’ anti-circumcision conclusions do not follow.  After all, the values of religious liberty and religious equality are at stake.  Suppose arguendo that, among American adults who were raised in atheistic households, the proportion of people who regret the godlessness of their upbringing is approximately the same as the proportion of American men who regret having been circumcised as infants.  Does Chambers think that parents with atheistic views should be legally forbidden to impart those views to their children?  Presumably the answer to this question is negative, but one then has to wonder why she is inclined to answer the parallel question about infant male circumcision affirmatively.
	Her stance on that latter question appears to derive from her assumption that the claims of Jewish and Muslim parents to religious liberty and religious equality are of no weight.  Her favored position on the matter of circumcision, which she labels as a “reasonable neutral policy,” is as follows: “There is reasonable disagreement as to whether circumcision is harmful. Therefore each man should be able to decide this question for his own body for himself. Permitting the circumcision of children violates their freedom and equality.”​[52]​  Here the aforementioned claims of the parents have vanished from sight.  Yet within Judaism the primary responsibility relating to circumcision is borne by the parents.  Biblical commands adjure them to have their male offspring circumcised at the age of eight days.​[53]​  It is the liberty of the parents to fulfill their religious obligations that is at stake when crusaders call for the legal proscription of infant male circumcision.  Moreover, with a backdrop of many centuries of vicious anti-Jewish persecution directed specifically against the practice of circumcision, it is the religious equality of Jews that is at stake when the crusaders issue their calls.
	To be sure, as I have already remarked, the claims of people to religious liberty do not justify their behaving in ways that inflict serious harm on other people.  If the practice of circumcising male infants were seriously harmful to the people who undergo the circumcisions, the practice could legitimately be prohibited despite the centrality of the ritual of circumcision to the Jewish and Islamic religions.  However, because the antecedent of that conditional is false, the consequent cannot be detached.
	In fairness to Chambers, I should note that a few of the closing pages of her article do briefly introduce the religious liberty of the parents as a consideration to be taken into account.  Nonetheless, her grappling with the matter is highly problematic in various respects.  Consider, for example, the following passage:
[I]t would be implausible to argue that parents may in general exercise their liberty via their children’s bodies. The related principles of bodily integrity and bodily autonomy place limits on parental action. Parents should not be able to express their religious liberty by tattooing their children with religious symbols. Parents should also not have complete authority to submit their children to surgical procedures: they may not authorise cosmetic surgery on their children so as to shape them to their own tastes. And parents should not be able to deny their children life-saving treatments on religious grounds.​[54]​
Whereas the final two sentences of this passage are unexceptionable, the assertion about tattooing is simplistic.  I am not familiar with any religion that places its adherents under duties to tattoo their children in infancy, but let us suppose that there is some such faith which I will designate as “Engravism.”  Whether this practice of tattooing could legitimately be proscribed by law is a complex matter rather than a matter to be settled by a blunt assertion.  Among the factors that bear on the issue are the importance of the required practice within Engravism, the harmfulness or unharmfulness of the tattooing, the conspicuousness of the requisite tattoo, and the degree to which any efforts to forbid the practice are products of sub-rational antipathy toward the Engravian religion.  These and other factors might or might not cumulatively undermine the legitimacy of the efforts to outlaw the Engravian practice.  (Of course, even if the tattooing could not legitimately be banned outright, it could legitimately be regulated – for example, to limit the size of any design.)
	Chambers goes on to proclaim: “So it is not plausible to say that there is reasonable disagreement on children’s moral status of the sort that would truly leave open the possibility that children’s freedom and equality, bodily integrity and autonomy, count for nothing.”​[55]​  Here she is attacking a straw man.  No responsible opponent of the crusades against infant male circumcision has ever suggested that the considerations listed here by Chambers count for nothing.
	Chambers contends that “to permit circumcision is to value the religious liberty of parents against the bodily integrity and autonomy of children, and this is not a reasonable trade off.”​[56]​  She avers that “if circumcision is required for religious reasons, it would still be unreasonable to circumcise babies and children since this would violate their bodily integrity and autonomy without contributing to their religious liberty.”​[57]​  This line of reasoning obviously cuts in both directions.  Chambers is worried about the prospect of trading off the bodily integrity and autonomy of infants against the religious liberty of their parents, but she is insouciant about the prospect of trading off the religious liberty of the parents against the bodily integrity and autonomy of the infants.  Despite her acknowledgment that “[b]oth bodily integrity and religious liberty are weighty values,”​[58]​ Chambers again adopts a position on the matter of circumcision which bespeaks her assumption that the religious liberty of Jewish parents – concerning the fulfillment of their religious duties to ensure that their male offspring are circumcised – is devoid of any weight.
	Adverting to a problem which I have broached above, Chambers declares that “parents who persistently restrict their children’s diet despite damaging their health, particularly if the damage to health is so extreme as to be irreversible or to cause the loss of body parts, should be liable for prosecution. But simply giving one’s child unhealthy food occasionally, or even frequently, is not analogous to the permanent removal of healthy body parts.”​[59]​  The reference to persistent restrictions is curious, since the problem of overweight children normally arises from an absence of sufficient restrictions.  At any rate, as can be inferred from my short earlier discussion of this matter, the dichotomy which Chambers draws between damaging a child’s health and frequently giving a child unhealthy food is simplistic.  Children who are persistently overweight at certain stages of development will typically become more prone in their adulthood to corpulence and to certain diseases such as diabetes.  That increased vulnerability, brought about through the frequent plying of a child with fattening foods, is irreversible.  If the inducement of that increased susceptibility is the sort of parental behavior which Chambers believes to be appropriately subject to prosecution, then she is advocating the imposition of criminal sanctions on very large numbers of her fellow parents in the UK (especially among people in the lower socioeconomic strata).  If instead Chambers believes that the heightening of a child’s proneness in later life to corpulence and certain diseases is not the sort of parental behavior that is suitably addressed through legal prohibitions and legal sanctions, her attitude toward such behavior is not reconcilable with her attitude toward infant male circumcision.
	Chambers presents a version of the Precautionary Argument that pertains to the matter of male circumcision.  In that argument, the import of the religious liberty of Jewish and Muslim parents again drops out of sight.  Let us examine each of the first two premises of her argument.  The first premise runs as follows: “Reasonable comprehensive doctrines disagree about whether circumcision is required for religious or clinical reasons.”​[60]​  Worth noting here is that this first premise is very likely false.  For example, Judaism’s commands are addressed to Jews rather than to non-Jews.  A follower of those commands can readily accept that the circumcising of male babies is not required of Gentile parents.  Similarly, although some substantial portions of the New Testament (especially in the Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline epistles) are focused on the question whether the practice of male circumcision is required of Christians, the negative answer to that question in the New Testament is entirely consistent with the proposition that Jews are required by their religion to have their male offspring circumcised.  Likewise, the Islamic religion directs its commands to Muslims rather than to people outside the faith.  Contrary to what is implied by the first premise in Chambers’s Precautionary Argument, the Abrahamic religions adopt positions on infant male circumcision that are consistent – because those positions are concerned with different groups of people.
	Even more important are my worries about the second premise in Chambers’s argument: “In the face of such reasonable disagreement, we should adhere to a precautionary principle and should therefore acquiesce to the proposition that the foreskin is valuable and should not be removed.  We are not thereby committed to accepting that such an assumption is true.”​[61]​  What is so striking about this premise is that it applies the protective ambit of a precautionary principle to the foreskins of infant males while excluding from that ambit the religious liberty of observant Jews and Muslims.  By constructing a Precautionary Argument as a means of vindicating her crusade against infant male circumcision, Chambers has again exhibited her assumption that the only thing of value at stake in the controversies over such circumcision is the foreskin.  For her, the liberty of observant Jews and Muslims to fulfill their religious duties concerning the foreskin is of no weight and is thus outside the reach of a precautionary principle.
	Chambers seeks to allay the consternation of observant Jews and Muslims whose religious liberty will be suppressed by the legal ban which she favors: “Even if one believes that circumcision is required for religious or clinical reasons, one can also believe that bodily autonomy makes it reasonable to preserve a man’s right to make this choice for himself.”​[62]​  Given that the policy of “preserv[ing] a man’s right to make this choice for himself” consists in legally prohibiting Jewish and Muslim parents from fulfilling their religious duties to have their male offspring circumcised, Chambers is here calling on such parents to accept the reasonableness of the suppression of their religious liberty.​[63]​  Her call to that effect would itself be reasonable if the practice of infant male circumcision had been shown to inflict serious harm on the people who are circumcised.  Legal restrictions on the liberty of Jews and Muslims to fulfill their religious duties can be reasonable insofar as the restrictions are introduced to avert serious harms that would be caused by the fulfillment of those duties.  However, as I have already observed, the best medical evidence tells against the reasonableness of Chambers’s position (either because the evidence indicates that the net effect of infant male circumcision is mildly beneficial, or because the evidence of any net benefit or harm is inconclusive).  Her stance is at odds with basic values of liberalism.
	Chambers tries to turn the tables on me by asserting that someone who holds that Jews and Muslims should be legally at liberty to have their male infants circumcised “must believe that bodily integrity and personal freedom [are] either not valuable at all, or that [they are] less valuable than the religious convictions of [other] people.”​[64]​  However, as should be evident from all my foregoing rejoinders to Chambers, it is certainly not the case that I attach no value to bodily integrity and personal freedom.  Throughout, I have readily accepted that the religious liberty of Jews and Muslims can legitimately be curbed if the curtailment of that liberty is necessary for the avoidance of serious harm to other people.  As for the value of personal freedom, I include a long exploration of that value in Liberalism with Excellence and an even longer exploration in my 2003 book The Quality of Freedom.​[65]​  The specific type of value which Chambers has in mind – the respect shown to a person’s faculty of decision-making when ill-advised options are left available to that person alongside good options – is not compromised by the lawfulness of the practice of infant male circumcision among Jews and Muslims.  When the law of a liberal democracy permits Jewish parents to have their sons circumcised at the age of eight days, it does so not for the purpose of averting misguided choices by those sons but instead for the purpose of allowing the parents to fulfill the duties under which they themselves have been placed by the commands laid down in the scriptures of their religion.  As I have already emphasized, the primary responsibility for circumcision is placed by the Hebrew Scriptures on parents.
	In response to my complaints about the connections between the contemporary anti-circumcision crusades in European countries and the many centuries of extreme persecution against Jews in most of those countries, Chambers writes as follows: “[T]he fact that a view can sometimes mobilise racism or other unreasonable positions cannot be a decisive strike against it, because that would rule out many reasonable political perspectives.”​[66]​  Chambers here misconstrues the tenor of my complaints.  Though the mobilization of bigotry is indeed prominent in the anti-circumcision crusades, I have never suggested that every participant in those crusades is motivated by considerations that are in themselves bigoted.  My complaint, rather, points to the fact that the social import of the participants’ actions is not fully determined by their own motivations.  In the context in which the crusades against infant male circumcision are carried on, those crusades are embedded in a legacy of bigotry irrespective of the participants’ motivations.
	I will shortly recount that context in some detail.  Before doing so, however, I should adduce an analogy that can serve to underscore the chief point which I will be making.  Let us ponder the gesture of flying the Confederate flag that is undertaken by some Americans.  Many of the Americans who fly the flag of the Confederacy (in any of its three main designs) do so on the basis of racist motivations.  However, not every American who hoists that flag is so motivated.  For some such Americans, the motivation lies in expressing their regional pride or in paying homage to ancestors who died during the American Civil War.  Should we conclude that the decisions of these Americans about displaying the emblem of the Confederacy are untainted by bigotry?  The answer to this question is negative because the social import of these Americans’ decisions and actions is not fully determined by their own motivations.  Whatever the motivations may be, these Americans by flying the Confederate banner are aligning themselves with a political entity whose raison d’être was to perpetuate the enslavement of black people.  Since these Americans are undeterred by the prospect of so aligning themselves, their exhibiting of the flag of the Confederacy is tainted by a legacy of bigotry regardless of their motivations.  They are deluding themselves if they think otherwise.
	Let us now return to the issue of infant male circumcision.  Because Chambers and I reside in England, I will comment here specifically on the English context in which the present-day crusades against such circumcision are waged.  However, nearly all of these comments are applicable mutatis mutandis to most other European countries as well.  Among the principal features of the context of the anti-circumcision crusades are the following.  First, the best medical evidence indicates either that the practice of infant male circumcision is mildly beneficial on balance or that the net effects of the practice have not yet been solidly demonstrated.  Second, the practice of infant male circumcision has been central to the Jewish religion (and to the Hebrew religion from which Judaism evolved) for three millennia.  Jewish parents are explicitly commanded in the Torah to have their male offspring circumcised at the age of eight days, and the fulfillment of that command has been carried out since ancient times.  The practice of infant male circumcision has been a defining feature of Jewish communities since antiquity, but especially since the rise of Christianity with its rejection of the obligatoriness of that practice for Christians.  Third, for close to a millennium from the eleventh century onward, Jews in England suffered ferocious persecution almost unremittingly in the form of numerous massacres, blood libels, mass expulsions and exclusions, communally imposed fines, severe restrictions on activities and movements and careers, forced conversions, daily subordination and violence, and systematic disqualifications.  (In some other European countries, the centuries of vicious anti-Semitic persecution by Christians extend back considerably further.)  Fourth, throughout the aeon of fierce anti-Semitism, one of the paramount foci of sub-rational antipathy toward Jews was the practice of infant male circumcision.  That practice was strictly forbidden by the pre-Christian Syrian and Roman conquerors of ancient Judea, and it was persistently singled out as an object of scorn and hostility during the centuries of grisly abuse of Jews by Christians.  One way of turning circumcision against Jews, prevalent in England as well as in Continental Europe for ages, became especially widespread during the Nazi era on the Continent: “It was not uncommon for police or local collaborators hunting for Jews to demand that men or boys pull down their pants so that they could see if they had been circumcised.”​[67]​  Fifth, parents in England are legally at liberty – and should be legally at liberty – to treat their children in various ways that are demonstrably harmful.  For example, as has already been remarked, parents in England are legally at liberty to provide their children frequently with fattening food even though their doing so is likely to cause the children to become persistently overweight and thus to be prone in adulthood to corpulence and certain maladies.
	Given these characteristics of the context in which the anti-circumcision crusades in England (and elsewhere in Europe) are conducted, the calls of the crusaders for a blanket ban with no exemptions for Jews and Muslims are subsumed within a lengthy history of bigotry.  Although such calls are less ugly than the efforts by Christians in previous centuries to stamp out what is distinctive of Judaism, they are continuations of those efforts – regardless of the motivations of the participants.  To be sure, if modern medical science ever produces solid evidence indicating that the net effects of the practice of infant male circumcision are seriously harmful, my claims in this paragraph about the anti-circumcision crusades might have to be modified.  (I might even cease to use the term “crusades” repeatedly when discussing this matter.)  At present, however, those claims stand.  Whatever the motivations of the anti-circumcision zealots may be, they have aligned themselves with a tradition of Jew-hatred.
	Solid evidence of serious harmfulness is what most saliently differentiates the matter of female genital mutilation from the matter of infant male circumcision.  I am entirely in agreement with the position attributed by Chambers to campaigners against female genital mutilation: “They argue that any racism in the status quo comes from a lack of successful prosecutions of FGM, which amounts to failing to protect black girls from abuse.”​[68]​  Worth noting here are a couple of further differences between the two issues.  First, female genital mutilation is not a practice within Judaism at all, and its obligatoriness within the Islamic faith is far more dubious than the obligatoriness of infant male circumcision.  Second, female genital mutilation is integrally linked to a lamentable history of patriarchal domination, whereas infant male circumcision is not.  Thus, contrary to what Chambers intimates near the end of her paper, my discountenancing of the crusades against infant male circumcision is fully consistent with my support for the campaigns against female genital mutilation.
	At any rate, while I have disagreed strongly with most of the arguments propounded by Chambers in the second half of her article, I am grateful to her for mulling over this contentious matter with impressive philosophical sophistication.  Though her lines of reasoning have left me unconvinced, they have obliged me to try to hone my own reasoning about this issue.

V.  Replies to Steven Wall

Steven Wall’s rich and fascinating article will elicit fewer replies from me than have the foregoing articles.  In Liberalism with Excellence I highlight some of the strengths of Wall’s version of edificatory perfectionism as well as some of its shortcomings, and I note the proximity of his perfectionism to Rawlsian liberalism in certain key respects (while also noting the major divergences).  Thus, I am scarcely surprised to find that Wall places pressure on Rawlsianism at some crucial junctures in his article.
One such juncture occurs in his illuminating discussion of developmental goods, where he observes that “Rawls himself called attention to the importance to people of discovering if not the best plan of life, at least plans of life that are satisfactory for them.  Each person, he claimed, has a responsibility to make a rational effort to discover his good.”  Having made this seemingly anodyne observation, Wall immediately tightens the pressure: “Yet Rawls was insufficiently attentive to the fact that different political/institutional environments facilitate or set back people’s efforts in this regard differently.  In virtue of this fact states can promote the good by sustaining or bringing about environments that enable their members to narrow the gap between their apparent and real good.”​[69]​  Rawlsians can and should reply for themselves, of course, to Wall’s clever move.  My own sense is that they will resist his perfectionism by resisting his version of subjectivism.  Enamored though Rawlsians are of idealizations in reasoning about justice, they will be wary of idealizations in reasoning about each person’s good – at least when those latter idealizations are adopted in an enquiry that seeks to pin down the limits of legitimate governmental action.
At a second juncture where Wall endeavors to maneuver Rawlsianism against itself, his efforts bear on my account of liberalism as well as on the Rawlsian account.  He is there discussing the situation of Jill, whose good would be furthered on balance by the enactment and enforcement of a law that prohibits the smoking of methamphetamine.  Wall cogently argues that a situation in which the net effect of such a law redounds to the benefit of Jill is a highly credible possibility.  However, he goes on to write as follows:
The same can be said of any value that accrues to Jill in virtue of having the freedom as such to take up this option.  It is possible that Jill’s ideal advisor might favor a situation in which the state trusts her not to misuse this option, even when the advisor knows she will misuse it.  Jill may have a strong individualistic nature and may deeply resent the suggestion that others should not trust her to make decisions, and her advisor may need to take heed of this.  Still, her advisor will likely judge that it is rational for her, to paraphrase Rawls, “to protect herself against her own irrational tendencies by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give her a sufficient motive to avoid foolish actions.”  And if it is rational for her to so consent, then the foreclosure of the option in question will be congruent with her guiding conception of the good.​[70]​
Here a reply on behalf of myself is also largely a reply on behalf of the Rawlsians, since the relevant strand of my argumentation against edificatory perfectionism is aligned with the argumentation of Rawlsians such as Quong.  As I have already indicated in my comments on Sher and on Billingham and Taylor, I am at fault for not having emphasized sufficiently that one of the main lines of reasoning in Chapter 5 of my book is deontological rather than consequentialist.  Admittedly, that line of reasoning is presented in the chapter alongside various consequentialist concerns, and it adverts to a property of the ban on methamphetamine that is a bad-making property; however, the tenor of the reasoning is deontological.  That is, when I maintain that the legal ban on the smoking of methamphetamine is an instance of disrespect for the capacity of each citizen to determine how she will live her own life (within the constraints imposed by requirements of justice), my complaint is undeflected by Wall’s observation that the lives of some citizens or even all citizens will go better in the presence of that ban than in its absence.  My point is about a matter of justice rather than about a matter of the good.
	Wall proceeds to contemplate whether “the state action in question wrongs Jack [a citizen who will not benefit on balance from the legal prohibition] even though it benefits Jill.”​[71]​  Though the Rawlsians and I would of course maintain that Jack is wronged by a law which prohibits the smoking of methamphetamine, we would reach the same conclusion about Jill – because that conclusion does not depend on whether somebody stands to benefit from the legal prohibition or not.  Jill is wronged by the legal proscription even though she stands to benefit on balance from it, because it treats her like a child whose practical reasoning about the smoking of methamphetamine is not the practical reasoning of a sane adult.
Two caveats should be entered here.  First, notwithstanding that the Rawlsians and I converge in our assessments of the legislation which Wall envisages, we arrive at the convergence from quite different bases.  In the eyes of Rawlsians the grounds for the condemnation of that legislation are contractualist and Kantian, whereas my grounds for the condemnation are Stoical (with a focus on the ways in which the constrainedness of a system of governance enhances the level of self-respect that is warranted for each citizen).  Second, my discussion of the ban on the smoking of methamphetamine is premised on the assumption that the ban has been adopted for the edificatory purpose which Wall assigns to it.  In extreme circumstances, such a prohibition might be adopted instead for the purpose of restoring basic public order.  If so, and if the prohibition is likely to be effective in furthering that latter purpose, it can be consistent both with the concerns of Rawlsians and with my Stoical concerns.
Despite the subtlety and perceptiveness with which Wall presents his account of subjectivist perfectionism (and of objectivist perfectionism with a subjective component), there are occasional passages in the account that are shuddersomely illiberal.  One such passage is the following: “The perfectionist state, on the subjectivist view, never substitutes its judgment in place of the authentic or informed judgment of those over whom it rules concerning the values and goals their lives should exhibit.  Subjectivist perfectionism is, in this key respect, inherently non-alienating.”​[72]​  On the one hand, the idealization invoked here by Wall pertains to errors of information or of non-evaluative cognition and reasoning.  It does not pertain to evaluative mistakes that are independent of those types of errors.  On the other hand, by adverting to an agent’s authentic or informed judgment as a basis for coercing the agent to act at odds with his or her actual judgment, Wall brings to mind the trenchant ruminations by Isaiah Berlin on doctrines of positive liberty that appeal to the notion of an authentic self.​[73]​  Virtually everything in those ruminations could be quoted pertinently here, but one substantial passage will suffice.  There Berlin used first-person singular pronouns to refer to an advocate of the type of perfectionism which Wall commends:
I am then claiming that I know what [people] truly need better than they know it themselves.  What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist me if they were rational and as wise as I and understood their interests as I do. But I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may declare that they are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists within them an occult entity — their latent rational will, or their ‘true’ purpose — and that this entity, although it is belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, is their ‘real’ self, of which the poor empirical self in space and time may know nothing or little; and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into account. Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves.​[74]​
To be sure, the final sentence of this quotation from Berlin may seem rather shrill in application to Wall.  Wall is a veritable liberal who scarcely advocates the bullying and oppression and torturing of people.  However, we can aptly say of Wall mutatis mutandis what Berlin said of T.H. Green: “Green was a genuine liberal: but many a tyrant could use this formula [by Green] to justify [the tyrant’s] worst acts of oppression.”​[75]​
	Wall’s rejoinder to my critique of the quidnunc mentality of edificatory perfectionism goes slightly astray at its outset by suggesting that my concern is that an edificatory-perfectionist system of governance will “interfere[e] in the lives of its subjects to an intolerable degree.”​[76]​  Though the degree of interference by such a system of governance will indeed very likely be inordinate, my concern is instead about the edificatory impulse which animates the interference and which endows it with its demeaningly meddlesome orientation.  In other words, my objections are aimed at the grounds for the interference rather than at its sheer extent (though, again, the extent will also very likely be objectionable).
	Wall is correct in concluding that I do not propound the justice constraint which he discusses.  Crucial though the realization of justice is as the top priority of any legitimate system of governance, it is not the sole function that can properly be undertaken by such a system.  More puzzling is the discussion by Wall of the justice/harm constraint.  He asserts that “[a] pattern of behavior, such as dangerous mountain climbing or participation in risky research trials, could be one that is targeted by well-designed soft paternalistic measures.”​[77]​  It is not clear to me what sorts of measures Wall has in mind.  If he is envisaging some outright bans, which he would presumably endeavor to justify through his idealizations of each person’s reasoning about the good, then he is correct in thinking that I am firmly opposed to any such policies.  Like the Rawlsians and Berlin, I reject Wall’s idealizations within any account of the limits of legitimate governmental action.  Consequently, I do not accept that outright bans on dangerous mountain climbing or on participation in risky research trials would be instances of soft paternalism.  Rather, they would be instances of hard paternalism.  Hence, the dilemma posed for me by Wall – in which “[e]ither [Kramer] must abandon his acceptance of soft paternalism and affirm the justice constraint, or modify his characterization of the kind of state action that is self-aggrandizing and self-abasing”​[78]​ – does not arise in connection with prohibitions on the aforementioned activities.
	Perhaps Wall instead has quite different sorts of measures in mind.  In my book, I recount his sophisticatedly nuanced approach to the regulation of narcotics.​[79]​  I endorse quite a few of the techniques which he broaches, since they do not run afoul of my critique of the freedom-discounting aspects and the overweening aspects of edificatory perfectionism.  Some of those techniques, mutatis mutandis, could be applicable in the present context.  Most notably, a system of governance is fully entitled to perform an information-dispensing role which tries to ensure that people are not acting out of ignorance when they choose to ascend dangerous mountains or to participate in risky research trials.  Sternly worded warnings, in abundance, are entirely apt.  Relatedly, a system of governance can legitimately take steps to ensure that the choices of people to engage in such activities are voluntary and well-considered; for example, it can legitimately forbid the inclusion of anyone as a subject in a risky research trial unless he or she has furnished consent at least twice on occasions separated by a specified period of time.  Similarly, a system of governance can legitimately treat children like children by imposing a minimum age for the participation of anyone in risky research trials or in the climbing of dangerous mountains.  More controversially, though still legitimately, it can confine the scope of its mountain-rescue services to peaks that are not egregiously hazardous.  A general and well-advertised policy of restricting the mountain-rescue services in that fashion can be justified on the ground that it keeps governmental employees from incurring especially grave risks (in circumstances where the incurring of those risks would probably be futile in any event), but it can additionally or alternatively be justified on the ground that it may deter some would-be climbers from placing their own lives in especially grave peril.  Any such deterrent effect would stem from a policy of obliging the climbers to bear fully the consequences of their own well-informed decisions without governmental involvement.  That policy would hence be very different from edificatory penalties or taxes.
	Wall’s discussion of modest paternalism is marked by similar ambiguity.  Wall initially refers to “interventions designed to help people avoid foolish or irrational actions, given what they care about or value.”  Shortly thereafter, he refers to “interference with a person’s voluntary self-regarding decisions.”​[80]​  The latter bit of wording is much more ominous than the former.  Whereas the term “interference” suggests that penalties or taxes or comparably intrusive techniques are what Wall has in mind, the terms “interventions” and “help” are milder and more capacious.  The latter terms could denote policies akin to those which I have approvingly pondered in the foregoing paragraph.  Hence, before I can judge whether I am prepared to endorse any of the modest paternalism which Wall commends, I will need to know more about the techniques which he envisions.  In these matters, the specifics are all-important.
	Because Wall’s justice/ends constraint is grounded on the idealizations of subjectivist perfectionism, I naturally reject it as an encapsulation of the limits on legitimate governmental action.  Worth adding here is that my spurning of that constraint is decidedly not due to my having embraced a non-idealized subjectivist account of the good.  On the contrary, like Wall in most of his writings, I espouse an objectivist account of the good.  Were I mounting a critique of subjectivist perfectionism as a theory of the good, I would be complaining not about its idealizations but about its subjectivism.

VI.  Replies to Cécile Laborde

Since I concur with most of the contentions in Cécile Laborde’s splendid paper,​[81]​ my responses to it will be very brief.  Just about the only dubious passage occurs early in her paper, where Laborde subtly but significantly misconstrues my position on the possibility of staking out a neutral stance in the debates over abortion.  She begins as follows: “A thought-provoking suggestion made by Kramer is that neutrality can be salvaged if the conservative Catholic position is unequivocally exposed to be false.  If it is false, it thereby becomes unreasonable.  This is because if foetuses are in fact not persons, then Catholics have no good reason to deny the political value of women’s right to control their own bodies.”​[82]​  The word “unequivocally” in the first sentence of this quotation is too strong, at least if “unequivocally” entails “uncontroversially.”  I do not suggest in my book that neutrality will be unsalvageable in the debates over abortion unless the falsity of the conservative Catholic position is demonstrated to the satisfaction of conservative Catholics.  Rather, I maintain that neutrality will be salvageable if some arguments that soundly refute the conservative Catholic position are put forward (whether or not the soundness of the refutation is conceded by the conservative Catholic thinkers themselves).  In other words, my complaint is not that the conservative Catholic position has yet to be rebutted in ways that persuade conservative Catholics; my complaint, rather, is that the lines of reasoning advanced in support of the conservative Catholic position have heretofore been disregarded rather than rebutted by Rawlsians and other liberal neutralists.
	Much more problematic is the remark that immediately follows the one just quoted: “Ergo, asserting the right of women to have an abortion is neutral towards all reasonable conceptions of the good.  So Kramer’s strategy, if successful, would in effect make disagreement about abortion unreasonable.  It would refute the widely accepted considered judgement that what Rawls calls the burdens of judgement apply – paradigmatically - to this and other cognate problems.”​[83]​  Laborde here runs together two senses of “reasonable” which Chambers and I have striven to disentangle.  On the one hand, a position on a certain matter can be reasonable in that it is consistent with all the basic values of political liberalism.  Reasonableness of that type is what is being gauged in debates over the neutrality of governmental policies among reasonable conceptions of the good.  On the other hand, a position on a certain matter can be reasonable in that the adoption of it is explainable by reference to the burdens of judgment.  Such a position is reasonable in the sense of not being outlandish.  Now, a position can be reasonable in the latter sense without being reasonable in the sense that is relevant to the debates over the neutrality of governmental policies among reasonable conceptions of the good.  Hence, although a properly argued refutation of the conservative Catholic position on abortion will reveal that that position is not one of the reasonable conceptions of the good among which any governmental policy should remain neutral, it will not imply that the conservative Catholic position is unreasonable in the sense of being inexplicable by reference to the burdens of judgment.
	There is virtually nothing else in Laborde’s paper with which I disagree.  A handful of dubious statements in her “simple case” for a neutralist stance in support of same-sex marriage are countered by Laborde herself when she goes on to introduce some complications that confront neutralists.  Indeed, my lone concern is that Laborde goes too far in the direction of Chambers and Quong, who contend that the only position on same-sex marriage consistent with liberal neutralism is a stance in favor of the discontinuation of state-recognized marriages altogether.  She writes as follows:
The liberal view of marriage is amato-normative – it privileges permanent, bi-amorous, exclusive relationships - and therefore is not neutral towards reasonable conceptions of the good. As Chambers has suggested, the institution of marriage is inevitably perfectionist, in the sense that it promotes a conception of the good that directly conflicts with alternative reasonable conceptions. Among the latter, she lists conceptions of the good life that value feminism, impermanence, celibacy, or non-monogamy.​[84]​
There are two main difficulties that afflict this position taken by Laborde and Chambers and Quong.  First, all the failings ascribed here to the institution of marriage are contingent rather than inevitable.  To be sure, even after the expansion of that institution to encompass same-sex unions, it does favor “permanent, bi-amorous, exclusive relationships.”  However, as is made clear by the work of Elizabeth Brake and others, the institution of marriage can be expanded much further to encompass relationships that are non-permanent, multiple-partnered, and non-sexual.​[85]​  Of course, even after the institution of marriage has been expanded in these ways, it will continue to favor relatively stable relationships over highly transitory relationships or solitariness.  However, given the importance of stable relationships for the preservation and flourishing of any society, that pattern of preferential treatment is consistent with liberal neutralism.
	Over the centuries, marriage has indeed been a vehicle for the sustainment of male dominance (and for the sustainment of racial or ethnic dominance, through bans on cross-racial or cross-ethnic marriages).  However, its transformation into an institution of equality between men and women is not precluded by its sorry history, any more than is the comparable transformation of the franchise precluded by the lamentable history of restrictions on the entitlement to vote.  Over the centuries, the entitlement to vote has been a vehicle not only for the sustainment of male dominance but also for the sustainment of sundry other illegitimate hierarchies.  Liberal democrats have appropriately responded to that dismal history not by calling for the abolition of enfranchisement but instead by calling for the transformation of it into a vehicle for the realization of equality.  Instead of striving to eliminate the franchise, they have striven to eliminate the restrictions on it.  Similar efforts to transform the institution of marriage – efforts that have already partially succeeded – are to be encouraged.
	To see a second major weakness in the position taken by Laborde and Chambers and Quong, we should initially note that the expansion of the institution of marriage as envisaged by Brake is not justifiable in compliance with the demands of Rawlsian public reason.  The difficulty lies not in the fact that the expanded institution will continue to favor relatively stable relationships over highly ephemeral relationships and solitariness, but instead in the fact that it will treat all stable and benignly intimate relationships broadly on a par. ​[86]​  If the advocates of such an expansion are to vindicate their proposal, they will have to rebut the arguments of conservative Catholics and others for treating some types of stable and benignly intimate relationships preferentially.  Having transgressed the constraints of public reason by engaging with such arguments, those advocates can thus establish that their proposal is neutral after all.
Contrary to what Chambers and Laborde and Quong suggest, a policy of doing without the institution of state-recognized marriage must contravene the constraints of public reason in much the same way as a policy of expanding that institution.  I will here quote what I have written in a footnote of my book:
[T]he discontinuation of state-recognized marriage would relocate rather than eliminate the difficulties that confront neutralists.  Even in a society without any state-recognized marriage, governmental institutions will have to regulate people’s multifarious intimate relationships (in order to determine the legal positions – the legal entitlements and responsibilities and susceptibilities – of the people in those relationships).  In so doing, the governmental institutions will have to decide whether same-sex relationships and polygamous relationships are to be treated on a par with monogamous heterosexual couplings or not.​[87]​
If the philosophers who seek the discontinuation of the institution of state-recognized marriage wish to maintain that private-law adjudicators and other governmental officials should treat same-sex relationships and polygamous relationships broadly on a par with monogamous heterosexual unions, they will need to engage with arguments parallel to those which have to be controverted by the philosophers who champion the expansion of the institution of state-recognized marriage.  Having dispatched such arguments, those opponents of state-recognized marriage can establish that their egalitarian view of sundry relationships is neutral after all.  However, their establishment of that point will have proceeded by transgressing the limits of public reason.
	My conclusion in the preceding paragraph will probably not greatly trouble Laborde and Chambers.  Although each of them aligns herself with Quong on the issue of state-recognized marriage, neither of them is an orthodox neutralist who seeks to abide by the restrictions of public reason.  For Quong and other thoroughgoing neutralists, by contrast, the problem of intimate relationships – within or without the institution of state-recognized marriage – is an impediment to the realization of their theoretical ambitions as much as is the problem of abortion.

VII.  Replies to Zofia Stemplowska

	Early in her delightful paper, Zofia Stemplowska points to something that has already come up in my replies to Sher.  That is, she notes that I use a variety of adjectives – such as “ample” and “strong” and “high” and “robust” and “hearty” and “solid,” all of which are deliberately rather vague – to characterize the level of warranted self-respect which an aspirational-perfectionist system of governance should be seeking to make attainable by every member of the society over which the system presides.  She is correct in stating that not all of those adjectives are interchangeable in this context.  Whereas “ample” and “high” refer chiefly to the magnitude of the level of warranted self-respect, “robust” and “solid” refer chiefly to the resilience or tenacity of that level.  I was aiming to capture both of those properties through my use of a variety of terms.  In passing, Stemplowska queries whether the sizeableness of the level of warranted self-respect is genuinely relevant: “Why isn’t it enough that a person’s [warranted self-respect] is merely high enough to have a just life?  Income and wealth, after all, need not be ample, for Rawls, they need merely suffice for justice.”​[88]​  Although her observation about Rawls is apt in relation to income and wealth, it is not similarly apt in relation to warranted self-respect.  In particular, Part Three of A Theory of Justice – the portion of the book that is most important for aspirational perfectionism – militates against the extension of Stemplowska’s observation to the primary natural good of warranted self-respect.
	With great astuteness, Stemplowska alights upon a matter about which I should have been more expansive in my book.​[89]​  My reference there to every law-abiding citizen occurs specifically in a discussion of the excellence constituted by the sturdy functionality of a liberal-democratic system of governance in a society.  Such excellence is something in which every law-abiding citizen can warrantedly take pride.  Some citizens in that society who are not law-abiding – for example, citizens who frequently incur parking tickets but who do not violate the society’s more important legal requirements – are also warranted in taking pride in the excellence of the institutions of liberal democracy.  By contrast, citizens who have firmly set themselves against the moral order of their society by engaging repeatedly in very serious criminality are not warranted in feeling proud about the moral excellence with which their society is endowed through the aforementioned institutions.  They might be warranted in taking pride in some of the other modes of excellence attained within their society, but their own depravity excludes them from the class of people who can warrantedly take pride in moral excellence.  In my book, I have used the adjective “law-abiding” to signal that exclusion.
	In other words, although someone can warrantedly feel proud about fine achievements by other members of his society in areas of endeavor that are not to his liking, he cannot warrantedly feel proud about their fine achievements (such as the sustainment of a liberal democracy) which he himself has resolutely essayed to avert or undermine.  One’s having been supportive of the relevant achievements is not necessary for the warrantedness of one’s vicarious pride in them, but one’s not having acted in determined opposition to them is necessary for the warrantedness of one’s harboring such pride.  I am grateful to Stemplowska for prompting me to enlarge upon this point.
	There is no full symmetry between the warrantedness of vicarious pride and the warrantedness of vicarious shame or dismay.  As I maintain in my book, prophets who struggle heroically against the grievous wrongs in their societies – people such as Vaclav Havel and Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Sophie Scholl and Andrei Sakharov and Rosa Parks and Liu Xiaobo and Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King – are warranted in feeling shame on behalf of the societies with which they are associated.  Feelings of vicarious shame (so vividly expressed by ancient Hebrew prophets such as Jeremiah and Ezekiel) are warranted not because these valiant people themselves are supportive of the turpitude which they eloquently assail, but instead because their lives are embedded in societies that are shameful.  These prophets are warranted in thinking that, had their lives been embedded in societies about which they could have justifiably felt proud, those lives would pro tanto have gone better.  In sum, whereas one’s determined opposition to certain outstanding achievements in one’s society negates the warrantedness of one’s harboring any sense of vicarious pride in those achievements, one’s determined opposition to the heinous faults of one’s society does not fully negate the warrantedness of one’s harboring some degree of vicarious shame about those faults.
Of course, the heroism displayed by each of the people named here was so prodigious that the level of self-respect warranted for each of them was toweringly high in spite of the vicarious shame that was also warranted.  Stemplowska quotes a portion of a sentence from my book in which I am referring to one of the ancient Hebrew prophets: “[T]he conditions for the full warrantedness of a robust sense of self-respect on his part (or on the part of any of his fellow citizens) were not in place.”​[90]​  The wording of that sentence might be germane in application to the circumstances of the ancient Hebrew prophets – because individuals in ancient Israel and Judah identified their own fortunes so intensely with the fortunes of their society​[91]​ – but it is too strong to be generalizable.  Stemplowska is right to doubt that that wording is applicable to Vaclav Havel.
Stemplowska broaches a fascinating conundrum:
There was some limited active resistance to the Nazi regime in Germany in the 1940s but the problem is that this was done against the society rather than because of it. I do not mean that the majority was actively supporting the Nazis but that they were, at most, passively resisting and many did not do even that. Given this, it is not clear that those who did not actively resist could claim warranted self-respect on the grounds of any sufficient association with those who did. And similarly, it is not clear that those who did actively resist throughout are sufficiently associated with the Nazi regime to feel warranted shame at what it did.​[92]​
As Stemplowska is aware, the complexities sketched in this passage are even more gnarled in relation to Poland than in relation to Germany.​[93]​  At any rate, notwithstanding the intricacy of those complexities – and notwithstanding the indeterminacy generated by the vagueness of the concepts required to deal with them – the general lines of my handling of them should be clear from what has been said here.  Germans who actively supported the Nazis cannot warrantedly feel better about themselves by reference to the heroic resistance of some of their compatriots; Germans who resisted the Nazis are warranted in feeling worse about themselves with reference to the heinous wrongs perpetrated by many other members of their society, though any warranted levels of vicarious shame will typically be overshadowed by the levels of personal satisfaction which their own conduct warrants; and Germans who were largely passive are warranted in feeling vicarious shame about the atrocities perpetrated by their compatriots, personal shame about their own passivity, and a modicum of vicarious pride focused on the heroic resistance of some of their compatriots.
	Stemplowska ponders the foregoing matters under the heading of collective responsibility.  I do quite briefly discuss collective responsibility at a few junctures in Liberalism with Excellence, and I have discussed it at much greater length elsewhere,​[94]​ but it is not central to my elaboration of aspirational perfectionism.  I fully agree with Stemplowska that any attempt to base aspirational perfectionism on the notion of collective responsibility would not “establish the grounds for a purely vicarious pride and one that grounds pride of all members of society.”​[95]​  Central to my elaboration of aspirational perfectionism, instead, is the notion of vicarious pride arising from one’s relationships or association with other people.
	When Stemplowska turns to considering what sort of association is prerequisite to the warrantedness of vicarious pride, she enumerates three criteria.  As should be apparent from my responses to her hitherto, I do not fully accept any of her criteria.  For example, I endorse her particularity criterion only in the way suggested above by my explanation of the adjective “law-abiding.”  That is, someone cannot warrantedly take pride in the achievements of others which he or she has determinedly striven against.  Otherwise, however, Stemplowska’s particularity criterion is too restrictive (though it will in fact be satisfied in a vast array of contexts).  For one thing, it inappositely maintains that people cannot warrantedly feel proud about the outstanding accomplishments of someone else in a field of endeavor that is not to their liking.  On the contrary, natives or long-time residents of Salzburg can warrantedly feel better about their lives by virtue of their association with the city of Mozart even if they seldom or never listen to classical music.  Another shortcoming of the particularity criterion is its implication that people are unwarranted in feeling ashamed about the grave vices of their societies which they have endeavored to counter or avert.  As Stemplowska herself writes: “Usually, people attempt to identify some national characteristic or a process that gives rise to musical, sporting, academic or political achievements. But once the focus is on the characteristic or the process, one needs to own up to some of the failures of this characteristic or the process, not just the achievements.”​[96]​
	Still, although I do not subscribe to the three criteria which Stemplowska propounds, I concur with her verdicts on most of the concrete scenarios which she addresses.  Moreover, I endorse wholeheartedly the drift of the short final section of her paper.  Indeed, in a subsection near the end of Liberalism with Excellence (admittedly also rather short),​[97]​ I have sought to highlight the diversity of the fora in which the objectives of aspirational perfectionism can be realized.  On the one hand, in Liberalism with Excellence I have concentrated chiefly on national governments – because the book is concerned with the debates over neutralism versus perfectionism, which have been focused heavily on the roles of national governments.  On the other hand, as I venture to make clear in the aforementioned subsection, the warrantedness of vicarious pride can extend more narrowly or more broadly than the scope of a nation-state.  As Stemplowska contends, it can sometimes extend across all of humanity.  The greatest sense of awe that I have ever experienced was elicited not by my attendance at a Mozartian opera or a Shakespearean play, but by an undergraduate course on astrophysics at Cornell University in the late 1970s.  In that course, after weeks of effort, I succeeded in understanding the mathematical involutions of Albert Einstein’s special theory and general theory of relativity.  What astonished me was that Einstein had not only understood each of those theories but had discovered and formulated them!  I felt elevated by my membership in a species that had produced such a titanic feat of genius.  As Stemplowska’s closing discussion suggests, I was warranted in feeling so elevated.

VIII.  A Terse Conclusion
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